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Abstract
The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol display a broad
international consensus for biodiversity conservation and equitable benefit sharing.
Yet, the Aichi biodiversity targets show a lack of progress and thus indicate a need
for additional action such as enhanced and better targeted financial resource mobilization. To date, no global financial burden-sharing instrument has been proposed.
Developing a global-scale financial mechanism to support biodiversity conservation
through intergovernmental transfers, we simulate three allocation designs: ecocentric, socioecological, and anthropocentric. We analyze the corresponding incentives
needed to reach the Aichi target of terrestrial protected area coverage by 2020. Here
we show that the socioecological design would provide the strongest median incentive for states which are farthest from achieving the target. Our proposal provides a
novel concept for global biodiversity financing, which can serve as a starting point
for more specific policy dialogues on intergovernmental burden and benefit-sharing
mechanisms to halt biodiversity loss.
KEYWORDS
Aichi targets, biodiversity financing, Convention on Biological Diversity, fiscal transfers, international
environmental governance, policy proposal, protected areas
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I N T RO D U C T I O N

The ongoing loss of biodiversity is considered one of the
most serious global environmental problems because it
threatens the foundation of life-supporting ecosystems (Steffen et al., 2015). Accordingly, the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) aims at safeguarding the planet’s biosphere
through conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity. While the CBD recognizes national sovereignty as
a governing principle, it also affirms that the conservation
of biodiversity is a “common concern of humankind” and
thus a shared responsibility (United Nations & UN, 1992).
The parties to the convention agreed upon implementing

biodiversity strategies, monitoring, and conservation policies
at the national level, but also consented to institutionalizing
benefit sharing and funding mechanisms in the international
arena.
Overall, there are five strategic goals of the CBD for
2020: (i) mainstream biodiversity policies, (ii) reduce pressure through sustainable use, (iii) safeguard ecosystems,
species and genetic diversity, (iv) enhance and distribute benefits equitably, and (v) improve implementation (CBD, 2010).
These goals are operationalized in 20 targets, the so-called
Aichi targets (CBD, 2010). Most of the associated indicators show some but insufficient progress to reach the Aichi
targets by 2020; some show no significant overall progress,

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited.
© 2019 The Authors. Conservation Letters published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Conservation Letters. 2019;12:e12670.
https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12670

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/conl

1 of 8

2 of 8

some show movement away from the target, and very few
target elements show sufficient progress (CBD, 2014). Additional, more ambitious effort beyond the current Aichi targets
is required to bend the curve of biodiversity loss (Mace et al.,
2018).
One of the main causes of insufficient progress is inadequate financing (Balmford, Gaston, Blyth, James, & Kapos,
2003; Hill et al., 2015; McCarthy et al., 2012; Ring et al.,
2018; Waldron et al., 2013). Most conservation spending
in developed countries comes from domestic sources while
developing countries mainly rely on inter- and transnational
biodiversity financing (McCarthy et al., 2012; Ring et al.,
2018; Waldron et al., 2013). The international funding comes
through UN Agencies like the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) which operates the financial mechanism under the
CBD, and further bilateral international agreements (Ring
et al., 2018; Waldron et al., 2013). The lack of overall progress
towards the Aichi targets has led to calls for additional action
and innovative financial mechanisms (CBD, 2014; Mace
et al., 2018; IPBES, 2019).
Such mechanisms have been further specified in the
Nagoya Protocol: Article 10 declares that a global multilateral access and benefit-sharing mechanism “to support the
conservation of biological diversity” shall be considered by
the parties (Buck & Hamilton, 2011). The access and benefitsharing mechanisms are expected to create economic incentives for biodiversity conservation and although the CBD
states in Article 20 that developed countries shall provide
new and additional funding, no direct (financial) obligations
arise from this. The access and benefit-sharing mechanisms
are meant to facilitate “fair and equitable sharing of benefits”
that originate from the utilization of genetic resources, and
“appropriate funding” (Buck & Hamilton, 2011). An equitable sharing of private benefits with public administrations
(nation states) is at the core of access and benefit-sharing
mechanisms. However, conserving biodiversity also provides
transnational public benefits that spill over to other countries such as climate regulation, existence values, insurance
values, maintaining the gene pool and thus options for the
future (Bartkowski, 2017; Perrings & Gadgil, 2003). Accordingly, benefits and costs of conservation are unequally distributed (Balmford et al., 2003; Perrings & Gadgil, 2003;
Ring, 2008a). Thus, publicly shared but unequally distributed
costs and benefits constitute a rationale for an internalization
through intergovernmental benefit- and burden-sharing mechanisms to avoid underprovision of the related public goods
(Olson, 1969). A public to public mechanism design for what
constitutes a fair and equitable benefit sharing between states
has yet to be developed (Morgera, 2016).
Largely unnoticed by the international community, Brazilian states have created and implemented innovative Ecological Fiscal Transfers (EFT) since the early 1990s. In order to
compensate municipalities for the opportunity costs of host-
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ing protected areas on their territory, in 1991 the state of
Paraná implemented a mechanism that distributes a portion
of tax revenue to municipalities in proportion to the share
of municipal territory designated as protected areas (May,
Veiga Neto, Denardin, & Loureiro, 2002; Ring, 2008b). Several other Brazilian states have subsequently implemented
their own EFT schemes such that currently 17 out of 26
states have adopted various designs of the instrument (Droste,
Lima, May, & Ring, 2017; May et al., 2002; Ring, 2008b).
First impact studies show that the implementation of EFT
schemes creates an incentive for the receiving municipalities to increase protected areas (Droste et al., 2017; Sauquet,
Marchand, & Féres, 2014). In recent years EFT have gained
recognition and Portugal has implemented a similar scheme
at the national level in 2007 (Droste, Becker, Ring, & Santos,
2018a; Santos, Ring, Antunes, & Clemente, 2012). India has
just introduced a major EFT scheme in 2014, redistributing
7.5% of the tax revenue to be transferred to states based on
forest cover (Busch & Mukherjee, 2018). Several proposals
to consider protected-area related indicators in fiscal transfer schemes have been developed for Switzerland, Germany,
Poland, Indonesia and the EU, with a small-scale implementation in France (Droste, Ring, Santos, & Kettunen, 2018b;
Irawan, Tacconi, & Ring, 2014; Köllner, Schelske, & Seidl,
2002; Schröter-Schlaack et al., 2014). An adaptation to the
global level has been proposed but has not yet been designed
or simulated (Farley et al., 2010).
Here, we develop three related proposals for such an intergovernmental transfer mechanism to share financial burdens
of biodiversity conservation. We approach this task guided by
the principle of fiscal equivalence (Olson, 1969). This principle has been developed for the financing of public goods and
services within nation states. It asserts that those who benefit
directly from the good in question should also pay for the
costs of provision. It is meant to ensure an efficient provision
of public goods and services since free-riding on the efforts
of others incurs a suboptimal provision; making beneficiaries
pay reduces the deadweight loss. In the case of such spillover
benefits, the principle of fiscal equivalence calls for intergovernmental transfers in order to compensate those who
bear the costs of provision (Olson, 1969). A resulting global
EFT mechanism for the benefit sharing across nation states
would provide an important and innovative contribution to
reaching Aichi targets. This is especially the case since such a
mechanism may incentivize nations to supply global benefits
of conserving biodiversity through protected areas (Droste
et al., 2017, 2018a; Farley et al., 2010; May et al., 2002; Ring,
2008a,b; Sauquet et al., 2014). It is meant to provide input to
current efforts within the Intergovernmental Science-Policy
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services to identify
policies that could help to slow down, halt and potentially
reverse the current decline in biodiversity (Ring et al.,
2018).
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DEVELOPING POLICY OPTIONS

We propose three design options of a transfer scheme with
recurring payments. The ecocentric design is based on the
idea that larger protected areas are generally better for biodiversity conservation and thus measures the total extent of
protected area per country without relation to the size of the
country, the number of protected areas, or any socioeconomic
factors. The socioecological design adds a fairness element
by granting a relatively larger share of the fund to less developed states and therefore computes a ratio of protected areas
extent and the Human Development Index (HDI). Thus, the
lower the HDI, the larger is the corresponding country indicator. The anthropocentric design extends the socioecological
design by also accounting for population density. This would
maximize the number of people that benefit from protected
areas and thus increases the share for countries that have both
many protected areas and people. To account for the different contributions to conservation goals, we weight protected
areas under all designs by their IUCN category with increasing weights for stricter regulations. Thus, by design, protected
areas that conserve more wilderness and pristine ecosystems
are more “profitable” because they increase the ecological
indicator that ultimately determines the financial flows.
In the following, we exemplify our design options by
heuristic calculations to provide an intuition about how the
simulated distribution of payments is computed. Formal specification of the calculations can be found in the Supporting
Information. Suppose we take any country in the world. In this
country, a hypothetical 15,000 km2 of land is protected under
different categories of protection. Stricter protected area categories such as wilderness areas or national parks may provide more effective conservation than a sustainable land use
area where less stringent restrictions are in place. To account
for these differences, we weight different protected area categories according to their strictness of conservation. For example, a national park is fully accounted for by a weight of 1
but since a sustainable use area is not contributing so much
to conservation benefits, it only receives a weight of 0.5.
Of the 15,000 km2 of our example country, 5,000 km2 are
in national parks and 10,000 are sustainable use areas. We
therefore compute that there is a total of 10,000 km2 protected area to account for (5,000 × 1 for the national parks,
plus 10,000 × 0.5 = 5,000 for the sustainable use areas). For
the ecocentric design, this is the only factor we care about.
We proceed to calculate these weights for all protected areas
according to relevant IUCN categories for all countries and
distribute the funds available among all countries according to
their share of accountable protected area. The larger the total
area under protection, the more transfers a country would get.
Because we may also care about countries’ development
status, the socioecological design combines protected areas
with the country’s HDI. Suppose we have one country that is
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“fully developed” (HDI = 1), and a country in which many
basic needs of the people are not covered (HDI = 0.33). If
we only had these two countries, and both had 10,000 km2 of
accountable protected areas, and we took the HDI into account
inversely, the less developed country would get about three
times as much from the fund as the developed country to compensate for its development gap.
Now, we may care not only about protected areas and
development, but also about population. For the anthropocentric design, we also take population density into account.
Suppose we have three countries, all of which have an
accountable 10,000 km2 of protected areas, and all are fully
developed (HDI = 1) but their population density is different
(100, 200, and 300, people/km2 , respectively). In this case
the most densely populated country could receive three times
as much as the most sparsely populated country, and as much
as the two less densely populated countries combined.
In order to analyze these three designs, we can use different
indicators to assess and compare them. First, we can calculate
the total amount of transfers each country would receive: the
reward. Second, we can compute how much greater a reward
a country would receive if this country alone increased its protected area by say, one per cent of its total area. Let us call this
additional transfer the marginal incentive. Lastly, the strength
of the incentive may vary, depending on how rich a country
is. Thus, the leverage indicates this strength by relating the
incentive to the Gross Domestic Product as a measure of total
income per country.

3 RESULTING FINA NC IAL FLOWS
A N D I NC E N T I V E S
We simulate the resulting monetary flows per national CBD
party for an arbitrarily chosen total sum of one billion international dollars for all CBD signatory states with their PA from
early 2018. Figure 1 shows the reward, the incentive, and the
leverage per country for all three design options.
The ecocentric design rewards mostly large countries,
since they provide the largest extent of protected areas; it also
incentivizes large countries most and provides the strongest
incentives relative to GDP in Greenland and Africa. The
socioecological design benefits poorer countries in Africa,
Latin America and Oceania, but also Greenland and parts of
Northern Europe. It provides the largest marginal incentives
mainly in Africa and South Asia. The anthropocentric design
benefits small island states, and several densely populated
states with large protected areas across South (East) Asia,
Africa, Europe and Latin America. The marginal incentives
are highest in some Middle-Eastern and small island states.
In relation to GDP the anthropocentric mechanism design
incentives are strongest in small islands, and some African
states. The different design options thus come with different
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leverage in % of GDP

marginal incentives in $

ecocentric

EFT reward in $

1.08e+08

107

11800000 8.5e−08

0.0634

36410000

389700

1313000 2.35e−06

0.265

1.81e+08

57

29590000 5.02e−07

0.596

socio−ecological

0

anthropocentric

0

0

FIGURE 1

Global maps of different EFT designs and the resulting incentives. Incentives are computed as the marginal and per GDP change
in EFT flows for a unilateral protected area increase of 1% of total area per country, ceteris paribus. The countries are color coded in deciles and the
legends display an equal spacing per decile. Maps have a Robinson projection. Source: authors’ elaboration

allocative patterns, and the question of which pattern may
be more suitable to help the realization of international
conservation policy goals remains.

4 DES IGN CH O I C E BA SE D ON
CON S E RVAT I O N P O L I C Y G OA L S
The design choice is based on the following consideration:
The strongest incentive should go to those countries that are
the farthest from reaching the Aichi target. They are the ones
that need to increase protected area share the most and should
thus be incentivized most. In this, we follow the idea of a
standard-pricing approach, which stems from the intuition
that the optimal policy choice may be inferred from its relative contribution to the policy goal in question (Baumol
& Oates, 1971). We therefore base the comparative analysis of design choices on assessing a corresponding conser-

vation policy goal. We evaluate how far countries are from
reaching Aichi target 11, which states inter alia that, by 2020,
17% of all terrestrial land shall be under protected status
(Figure 2).
We proceed by grouping the countries’ distances to Aichi
target 11 by quartiles and compute the distribution of both
marginal incentives and leverage per quartiles for each of the
three mechanism design options. Figure 3 provides combined
violin and box plots of incentives per design for both marginal
and per GDP incentives (summary statistics are in the
Supporting Information). With regard to design choices, these
simulations provide a basis for a comparative assessment.
First, the median incentives in the socio-ecological design are
consistently highest for all quartiles. Second, in contrast to
both the anthropocentric and the ecocentric design designs,
the socioecological design provides the highest median in
terms of both incentive (about 2 to 20 times as high) and
leverage (3–24 times as high) for the quartile of countries that
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Aichi target 11 gap

Quartiles
no gap

low

med

high

FIGURE 2

Global map of countries’ gaps to fulfill Aichi target of 17% terrestrial protected areas by 2020, calculated as 17 minus the current
percent protected area coverage. Only IUCN categorized protected areas are considered. The countries are grouped in quartiles. Quartile colors are
light yellow for a gap of less than 0 up to 1.06, light orange for up to 8.86, dark orange for up to 15.20, red for up to 17.00. Non-CBD countries are
white. The map has a Robinson projection. Source: authors’ elaboration

have the largest distance to reaching Aichi target 11. Third,
the socioecological design has an increasing median incentive per quartile, thus sets stronger incentives the larger the
policy gap, and is the only design that gets this order right.
In these regards, the socioecological design outperforms the
other choices.

5

D E S I G N CH O I C E I M P L I CAT I O N S

Comparing the proposed design options, the socioecological design option allocates the fund such that those countries showing the least progress towards reaching a 17% protected area share by 2020 receive the strongest financial
incentive to designate additional protected areas. Thereby we
would expect these countries to have the highest probability
to respond to an implementation of the global EFT by increasing their protected area share. The mechanism can thus help to
reach Aichi target 11. Although Aichi target 11 is one of the
few targets that shows sufficient progress on a global level,
our policy gap analysis shows that country implementations
differ greatly. Since the socioecological design sets incentives
where the gap is largest, it may help to meet the target nation-

ally. Recent contributions also argue that humanity needs
to protect half the Earth in order to safeguard biodiversity
(Wilson, 2016). Also others have already called for more
ambitious future targets (Mace et al., 2018). We would thus
expect that Aichi target 11 will be increased for the post 2020
biodiversity targets.
Furthermore, we only assessed protected areas that were
categorized within the IUCN classification system and thus
omitted a substantial share of diverse nationally but not internationally classified protected areas. Yet, a global mechanism design needs to rely on a standard that allows for comparability across nations. The IUCN classification scheme
provides such a standard which also allows us to apply a
weighting scheme for different contributions of protected area
categories to conservation policies. While this could incentivize a classification of national protected areas within the
IUCN scheme, we acknowledge that this choice neglects certain national categories of protected areas in our current
EFT designs and future work could include those with an
appropriate classification. In particular, this regards placebased cultural institutions for conservation, as is recognized
in Aichi target 11 as “other effective area-based conservation
means.” Incentivizing conservation through protected areas
may furthermore have adverse effects on community-driven
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marginal incentive in $

ecocentric

socio−ecological

anthropocentric

1e+08

1e+05

1e+02
no gap
low
med

leverage of incentive/GDP in in %

high

1e+00

1e−03

1e−06

FIGURE 3

Per quartile distribution plots of incentives for the design options. The outer violin shape displays the data distribution through
indicating probability density by width. The inner boxplot shows the median at the bar, first and third quartile points as limits of the box, and outliers
as points. The first row indicates the marginal incentive in terms of an EFT change from a unilateral per country increase of its protected area share
by 1%. The second row indicates the incentives as an EFT change in percentage of GDP. Countries are categorized into quartiles according to
countries’ distances to fulfill the Aichi target of 17% terrestrial protected areas by 2020. The quartiles are “no gap” for a distance of less 0 up to 1.06,
“low” for up to 8.86, “med” for up to 15.20, and “high” for up to 17.00. The Y-axes are log to base 10 transformed and equal across the design
options per row. Source: authors’ elaboration

conservation initiatives. Important future extensions of the
current proposal should thus include biodiversity targeting,
directing flows where biodiversity is highest or most threatened, the inclusion of marine protected areas, and the consideration of local livelihoods.
Regarding the expenditure side, the original EFT in Brazil
come with no further spending strings attached. The resulting
fiscal flows are not project-based or tied to specific spending
purposes defined at higher levels of government and in this
way guarantee local sovereignty in deciding expenditure
priorities. A scheme without earmarking may thus be more
attractive from the perspective of recipients. While such a
design transferred to the global level would set incentives
through conditioning the transfers on performance of protected area provision, it would simultaneously grant the maximum spending autonomy and might thus be relatively accept-

able for sovereign governments. This design has the benefit
of being minimally prescriptive in terms of where and what
type of areas to protect while providing fiscal incentives for
voluntary and self-determined action. At the same time, (an at
least partial) earmarking of the transfers may ensure that parts
of the transfers are actually used for conservation purposes
and could thus increase effective management at the level of
receiving countries. From the perspective of potential donors,
the assurance that the funds are (at least partially) spent on
conservation purposes may be preferable to an entirely unconditional scheme since the usage of the funds is (partially) specified. The corresponding trade-off between national spending
autonomy and earmarking for conservation purposes is
thus one that is implicit in but not solved by our proposal.
However, we would consider partial ear-marking a potential
solution.
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Regarding funding sources, the current proposal leaves
untouched where the funding could or should come from.
Several proposals have been articulated. Farley et al. (2010)
propose raising funds through a global cap-and-trade mechanism on CO2 emissions; Hill et al. (2015) propose a global
currency transactions tax; Droste et al. (2018b) propose the
payments made by member states to the EU. Arriagada and
Perrings (2011) have proposed two options: (1) direct investment in conservation supply through the GEF and (2) a Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme. For the purpose of a global EFT, the latter two options show promise
because the GEF already operates the financial mechanism
under the CBD and EFT bear some similarities to PES and
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) schemes. PES and REDD+ schemes, however,
are often bilateral (or even subnational) agreements whereas
a global EFT would be a multilateral mechanism. Channeling funds through the agreed upon CBD financial mechanism, the GEF, thus seems most appropriate and is in line
with Hein et al.’s (2013) proposal for a “Global Biodiversity
Fund.” This nevertheless does not provide a definite answer
as to where the funds should come from. While in theory,
the resource mobilization could be pluralistic, ranging from
philanthropic to unilateral national pledges, the implementation and sources of the fund will have to remain subject to
international negotiation—as the example of the still not fully
financed Green Climate Fund shows.

6 A N E V I D E NC E - BA S E D ,
SIMULATED BUT
NONPRESCRI P T I V E PO L I C Y
PROPOSAL
We contribute a first policy design study on a global-scale
intergovernmental fiscal transfer scheme to support biodiversity conservation. We have simulated how different global
EFT design options would distribute incentives and assessed
their relative contributions to reaching the Aichi biodiversity targets. We show that the socioecological design that
combines the extent of protected area per country and each
nation’s development status would provide the strongest
median incentive for states which are farthest from achieving the target. By design the transfers would be conditional on
protected area coverage weighted by IUCN protected area category and are thus a type of performance-based fiscal transfer
(Droste et al., 2018b). Such a design has the benefit of having been implemented in similar forms among Brazilian states
and in Portugal, such that actual experiences can be further
explored and analyzed regarding design principles and outcomes (Droste et al., 2017, 2018a).
The main value added by this proposal, however, lies
in the upscaling of an existing instrument for biodiversity
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conservation to the global level. The proposed mechanism
fleshes out a neglected gap of burden and benefit sharing
in the current regime complex for biodiversity protection
(Raustiala & Victor 2004). As such it fills a gap on how an
access and benefit-sharing mechanism can be implemented
beyond bi- and multilateral agreements and provides an
innovative contribution to the current debates by specifying
an allocative transfer mechanism. We would expect that our
three-fold mechanism design proposal may serve as a starting
point for a more specific science-policy dialogue on benefit
and burden sharing of biodiversity conservation between
the CBD, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, and the broader
sustainable development community.
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